People who face adverse economic prospects save in order to maintain consumption. During wars and other periods of distress, the incentive to save was so strong that there would have been excess saving and a corresponding excess supply of commodities without a negative real interest rate. During the Great Depression, the interest rate mechanism failed to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium because the nominal interest rate could not fall further and deflation produced a positive real interest rate. The lesson from American economic history is that central banks should accept moderate inflation if an adverse political or economic shock causes consumer pessimism.
One would expect that the severity of the Great Depression in the 1930s made it easy to discern its cause, but far from it! No consensus has emerged on the cause of the Great Depression from the writings of three generations of economists, starting with those who, like John Maynard Keynes, lived through it. Certainly, most economists agree that aggregate demand must have declined, but there is no agreement on the source of the decline in demand and why lower demand set into motion a disastrous downward spiral in economic activity from which there was seemingly no escape. Keynes's view that a fall in investment spending reduced demand is still standing side by side with the hypothesis of Temin (1976) that autonomous consumption spending declined, and the hypothesis of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) who argued that a fall in the money stock lowered aggregate demand. Recently, even the consensus on the deficiency of aggregate demand has been challenged by Prescott (1999) , Ohanian (1999, 2004) , Chari et al. (2002) , Smiley (2002) and Powell (2003) who maintain that New Deal changes accounted for the persistence of the Great Depression.
This paper applies the tools of dynamic macroeconomic analysis to the Great Depression in the 1930s. The focus is on the first order optimum condition of consumers, which relates consumption growth to the real interest rate. Using American data, the Great Depression is compared with other severe economic downturns since the early 19 th century. The main puzzle is that there was no obvious economic shock to the U.S. economy in the 1930s, whereas there were strong shocks that could plausibly have given rise to economic depressions before and after the 1930s. Why has the Great Depression remained unique? Why did an elusive shock trigger an economic crisis in the 1930s, while easily identifiable shocks during national emergencies affected the U.S. economy much less earlier and later? In this article it is argued that a negative real interest rate guaranteed macroeconomic equilibrium during every emergency, except the Great Depression when deflation accounted for a positive real interest rate. During the Great Depression, the interest rate mechanism failed to produce a macroeconomic equilibrium because the zero-bound on the nominal interest rate implies that the real interest rate can be negative only if there is inflation. The finding that inflation is needed to prevent a depression if the equilibrium real interest rate is negative has important implications for the conduct of contemporary monetary policy. Central banks should abandon inflation targets if an economic shock induces an expected decline in consumption that requires a negative real interest rate.
Financial economists tend to dismiss the role of the real interest rate in macroeconomic history. Fama (1975) proposed that the real interest rate was constant and, commenting on real business cycle models, Black (1995, p. 118) opined that "Real interest rates are so unimportant that we can assume they are constant without changing the properties of our models significantly." In an empirical study of the U.S. real interest rate in the period from 1931 to 1979, Mishkin (1981) , however, found that the real interest rate "was extremely high during the contraction phase of the Great Depression" and negative during the oil crisis in the 1970s. He concluded that "nominal interest rates contain little information on real interest rates and hence on the tightness of monetary policy." Earlier, Fisher (1933) , who paid close attention to the possibility of a negative real interest rate in the Theory of Interest ( 1 9 3 0 , p p . 4 0 -4 1 , 6 7 , 2 8 2 -2 8 6 , 3 1 1) , recommended 'reflation' as a measure to overcome the Great Depression. He arrived at this policy recommendation putting forward a deflation-debt theory of the Great Depression in which unanticipated deflation causes high ex post real interest rates and debtor insolvency. In this study the term 'real interest rate' is reserved for the natural interest rate that equates planned saving with investment. The crucial point is that the ex ante real interest rate exceeds the natural interest rate if the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate is binding.
Although Black, who is best known for his work on option pricing, is dismissive of the real interest rate in financial and macroeconomic models, he emphasizes its significance during the Great Depression. His book, Exploring General Equilibrium (1995) , is written in a "nonacademic" style (p. xi), which may explain why his ideas have not gained more currency in macroeconomics. Black was a staunch equilibrium economist, proclaiming "I see the world through equilibrium glasses; I don't think they fail me very often." (p. xi) Nevertheless, he does not hesitate to apply a disequilibrium analysis to the Great Depression that is necessitated by the zero bound on the nominal interest rate.
"… deflations forced short-term nominal interest rates to zero in some countries, and would have made these rates negative were it not for the effective floor at zero. This caused disequilibrium in real asset markets. The real interest rate was forced above its natural level. … In this situation, currency and government bonds became very attractive relative to real assets. Real asset prices fell to artificially low levels. Most new investments became unattractive. Saving became more attractive, and consumption became less attractive." (Black 1995, p. 82) In this article these ideas are worked out more formally and given empirical support, at a level that is accessible to an applied macroeconomist who is interested in policy. The article provides evidence for the view that all business cycles in the U.S. since the mid-19 th century can be understood as equilibrium responses to economic and political shocks, except for the Great Depression when an economic disequilibrium prevailed.
In Section 1 the theory of consumer behavior is reviewed, which provides the foundation for the determination of the real interest rate. Section 2 contains a historical narrative of the behavior of the real interest rate in the United States since the early 19 th century. In the historical analysis it is assumed that the consumption Euler equation represents a macroeconomic equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth. In Section 3 it is shown how the monetary standard conditioned the inflation process and price level expectations. The econometric analysis, which is provided in the next two sections, supports the hypothesis that there exists an equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth. In Section 4 the nonlinear consumption Euler equation is estimated and in Section 5 the log-linear functional form is considered. The second moments, which enter the log-linear Euler equation, are estimated using the EWMA/ARCH methodology. Section 6 concludes with a word of caution against the use of monetary policy rules in the presence of adverse political and economic shocks that give rise to consumer pessimism and a negative real interest rate.
Consumer Behavior
Consider a consumer who decides on consumption in two time periods. The optimum condition, which is known as the consumption Euler equation, is:
To illustrate, assume that the real interest rate r equals the subjective discount rate ρ. Then, it is optimal to keep consumption constant because the marginal utility of consumption must be the same in each time period, u'(C t ) = u' (C t+1 ). The gap between r and ρ determines the optimal time path of consumption. When r exceeds ρ, the consumer plans to spend more in the next period than in the current one because marginal utility in t+1 must be less than marginal utility in t. This assumes that marginal utility falls when consumption increases. Of course, the consumer postpones consumption if the real return on saving exceeds the subjective discount rate.
Equation (1) can be applied to the representative consumer in a dynamic macroeconomic model. Then, the equation includes two endogenous variables, the real interest rate and the growth rate of per capita consumption, . To quantify the relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth, it is necessary to specify the period utility function. The CRRA utility function,
, is often used in macroeconomic models because, as shown by Prescott (2006) , it is compatible with the long-run behavior of macroeconomic variables. The acronym CRRA stands for constant relative risk aversion, where the coefficient of relative risk aversion θ determines the degree of diminishing marginal utility. Substituting marginal utility, '( ) ,
− for the growth rate of consumption, this can be written as:
Since r, ρ and g are all small, applying logarithms yields the approximation:
Optimal consumer behavior implies that the real interest rate equals the sum of the subjective discount rate and the product of the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the growth rate of consumption. Since θ is positive, there exists a positive relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth. In the steady state, consumption is constant (g = 0) and the real interest rate equals the subjective discount rate. In this paper special attention is paid to situations in which a fall in consumption requires a negative real interest rate. For example, the real interest rate is minus 13 percent if ρ is 2 percent per year, θ equals 1.5 and consumption falls by 10 percent per year.
Inflation renders the real interest rate uncertain if interest rates are set in nominal terms in credit contracts. If both the real interest rate and future consumption are uncertain, the consumption Euler equation is:
Here, E t i s t h e c o n d i t i o n a l m a t h e m a t i c a l e x p e c t a t i o n , u s i n g a l l i n f o r m a t i o n available at time t. Since current consumption is known, equation (5) can be written as:
Using the same period utility function as before, the optimum condition is:
The expectation operator should not be written into the nonlinear expression on the right-hand-side of equation (7). Instead, Romer (2006, p. 369) computes the expectation of a second order Taylor series approximation of
around r = 0 and g = 0. Solving for the expected real interest rate yields:
This equation shows the equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth if both quantities are uncertain. The expected real interest rate is positively related to the expected rate of consumption growth and the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth, and it is negatively associated with the variance of consumption growth. The first two terms on the right-hand-side of equation (8) correspond to equation (4) using expected consumption growth. The third term, the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth, measures the consumption risk of an investment. An asset whose return is positively correlated with consumption yields a high return when the marginal utility of consumption is low (and a low return when marginal utility is high), making it an inefficient vehicle for consumption-smoothing. Therefore, consumers demand a high real interest rate if the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption is positive. Finally, the variance of consumption growth interacts negatively with the real interest rate because an increase in consumption volatility induces precautionary saving, putting downward pressure on the real interest rate.
From 1831 to 2004, the growth rate of American per capita consumption was 2 percent per year, the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth was 0.0002, and the variance of consumption growth was 0.002.
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Plausible parameter values of the utility function are ρ = 2 percent and θ = 1.5. With these figures, equation (8) yields a mean real interest rate of 4.28 percent, which is not far from the historical average of 3.57 percent. It seems that the covariance and variance terms do not matter much in equation (8), at least in the long-run. The covariance term increases the mean real interest rate by only 0.03 percent and the variance reduces it by 0.75 percent. However, this estimate of the average real interest rate is based upon unconditional moments, whereas equation (8) really holds for conditional moments. The conditional moments of macroeconomic time series, including the real interest rate and consumption growth, depend on economic conditions. Therefore, it is possible that the second moments in equation (8) have a sizeable effect on the expected real interest rate during a war or some other emergency, even if their long-run effect is negligible. In Section 5, the conditional second moments are estimated using the EWMA/ARCH methodology.
The American Real Interest Rate
The theory of consumer behavior predicts that the real interest rate is negative during a severe crisis that affects consumption. Even a modest cutback in consumption requires a negative real interest rate in equation (4) and a drop in expected consumption reduces the expected real interest rate in equation (8). The expected real interest rate also falls because the conditional variance of consumption growth increases during a crisis. As will be seen in Section 5, the sign of the conditional covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth depends on the nature of a crisis. In Figure 1 , the real interest rate is the short-term nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate in the preceding year. The shaded areas indicate the most severe periods of national distress that have affected the United States since the early 19 th century: the Civil War (1861-65), World War I (1914-18), the Great Depression (1929 -33), World War II (1939 , the Korean War (1950-53), the oil crises (1973-74 and 1979-80) , and the attack on the World Trade Center that led to the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (since 2001). The real interest rate became negative during every major war, it turned negative when deflation ceased in the 1930s and it was negative during the oil crises. At the same time, the real interest rate became negative without obvious national distress only once, during the economic recession in 1957-58. Like the other wars, the Vietnam War (1964-75) led to inflation, but the real interest rate remained positive even when fighting was most intense (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) . Table 1 summarizes all periods of national distress during which the real interest rate became negative. It is easy to calibrate equation (8) with realistic parameter values so that plausible assumptions on the conditional moments produce the observed real interest rates during the emergencies in Table 1 . During the Civil War, the minimum real interest rate occurred in 1864, when it fell to minus 19.0 percent. In the same year, real per capita GNP dropped by 11.1 percent. If ρ = 0.02 and θ = 1.5 and taking GNP as proxy for consumption, equation (4) predicts a real interest rate of minus 14.7 percent. From 1831 to 2004, the standard deviation of consumption growth was 4.5 percent and the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth was close to zero. Assuming the standard deviation doubled in 1864 and neglecting the covariance, equation (8) predicts a real interest rate of minus 17.7 percent. The equations also work well at the end of the sample period. In 1974, during the first oil crisis, real per capita consumption fell by 2.3 percent. Making the same assumptions as before, equation (4) predicts a real interest rate of minus 1.5 percent and equation (8) yields minus 4.5 percent. In fact, the real interest rate was minus 3.1 percent, which lies between these two estimates. Negative real interest rates are a key feature of American business cycle history. The real interest rate was negative in 35 years during the 174 years covered by Figure 1 . Macroeconomic equilibrium requires a negative real interest rate if the economy is hit by a strong shock that affects consumption. In periods of national distress, people saved because they expected that consumption would fall and the perceived variance of consumption growth was high. People who face adverse economic prospects save in order to maintain consumption. There is an incentive to save because the expected marginal utility of future consumption is high if expected consumption is low and/or uncertain. In periods of national distress, the incentive to save was so strong that there would have been excess saving and a corresponding excess supply of commodities without a negative real interest rate. For this reason, negative real interest rates prevented the recessions during wars and other periods of distress from becoming outright depressions.
The history of the Great Depression in the 1930s confirms that negative real interest rates were instrumental in preventing more depressions in American economic history. Since real per capita consumption dropped by 10.1 percent in 1931 and 11.5 percent in 1932, it is likely that expected consumption fell and the variance of consumption increased. Using equation (8) with the same parameter values and second moments as for 1864, the real interest rate should have been minus 16.2 percent in 1931 and minus 18.2 percent in 1932. Instead, the real interest rate was strongly positive in these years, namely 11.0 and 13.1 percent. This is a gap of 27.2 percent in 1931 and 31.3 percent in 1932! Clearly, the positive real interest rate that prevailed during the Great Depression was not an equilibrium rate. The finding that the real interest rate exceeded the natural rate by a wide margin gives credence to the Keynesian view that saving was excessive during the Great Depression, although Keynes attributed this more to a decline in investment than to an increase in saving. But Temin (1976) has a strong case that the Great Depression was caused by insufficient consumption. Romer (1990) and Greasley et al. (2001) , who consider the consumption hypothesis of the Great Depression, use stock market volatility as a measure of consumer expectations. Weder and Harrison (2006) compute a consumer confidence index that is based on the spread between high risk and low risk corporate bonds. In Section 5 of the present paper, the conditional variance of consumption growth provides a direct measure of consumer uncertainty.
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During the Great Depression, the interest rate mechanism broke down because a negative real interest rate can be achieved only if there is inflation. It is well known that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative in a monetary economy. The fact that the nominal interest rate cannot be negative implies that a negative real interest rate can prevail only if there is inflation. 3 The crucial difference between the Great Depression and the other periods of national distress is that prices fell strongly during the former, while there was moderate to high inflation during the latter. In the next section, it will be argued that the effective monetary standard made it likely that agents expected deflation during the Great Depression and inflation during all other crises. As a consequence, the ex ante real interest exceeded the negative natural interest rate during the Great Depression.
4 Except during the Great Depression, inflation made it possible that the negative natural interest rate, which was required by consumer pessimism, was indeed realized. During the Great Depression, the interest rate mechanism failed to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium because the nominal interest rate could not fall further and deflation produced a positive real interest rate. 6 The gold standard was incompatible with a flexible inflation rate, whereas the monetary authorities were free to inflate when a paper standard was in force.
Although the United States did not change the official gold price from 1837 to 1933, the gold standard was not always fully operational in this period. To finance the Civil War, the Union issued paper money, the so-called greenbacks, and it sold government bonds to national banks, which held them as legal reserves against their bank notes. From 1861 to 1879, there was a dual monetary standard, in which gold coins circulated side-by-side with greenbacks. The expansion of paper money generated inflation and a premium on gold during the Civil War. During the first three years of World War I, it was easy for the United States, which was still neutral, to maintain the gold standard because European gold flowed across the Atlantic to pay for armaments and strategic raw materials. But the influx of gold led to an expansion of the American money supply that caused inflation. After entering the war in 1917, the United States ran a budget deficit that was partly monetized by the Federal Reserve. This produced more inflation and a loss of official gold reserves. As a consequence, the United States restricted the export of gold, undercutting the gold standard.
During World War II, the gold standard was not operational and, as during the Civil War and in 1917-18, inflation was fueled by the printing press. After World War II, the Bretton Woods international monetary agreement linked all countries indirectly to gold through fixed exchange rates with the U.S. dollar, which was defined in gold. Foreign governments had the right to exchange dollars for gold at the U.S. Treasury, but American residents were not allowed to hold monetary gold. This arrangement gave the United States some leeway in monetary policy because foreign governments were expected to exercise restraint 5 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) show that there is a risk of an economic collapse if the zero-bound on the nominal int erest rate is binding. 6 F r i e d m a n a n d S c h w a r t z ( 1 9 6 3 ) p a y c
l o s e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t conditioned U.S. monetary policy and inflation.
in the demand for American gold during emergencies. The Bretton Woods system was sufficiently flexible to absorb the spike in inflation during the Korean War, but the U.S. inflated for too long in the 1960s and the system collapsed in 1971. Afterwards, central banks took control of national inflation rates in a system of independent paper standards.
The United States abolished the export restriction on gold in 1919 and the international gold standard had been restored by the mid-1920s. Therefore, the world entered the Great Depression with a monetary system that did not allow for deliberate inflation when a negative real interest rate was required for macroeconomic equilibrium.
7 Central bankers, who were impervious to the social cost of falling output and high unemployment, embraced deflation in order to bring commodity prices in line with the official gold price. 8 In the United States the deflationary process ended only when Franklin D. Roosevelt abandoned the gold standard after taking office in 1933. Not surprisingly, consumer pessimism persisted for some time and the real interest rate became negative in 1934 ( Figure  1 ). This analysis implies that there was a macroeconomic disequilibrium from 1930 until 1933, whereas the economic contractions during wars and periods of national distress were equilibrium responses of the economy to exogenous shocks. The inability of the economy to achieve a new macroeconomic equilibrium, which was caused by the failure of the interest rate mechanism to equate saving and investment, explains the unusual severity of the Great Depression.
Econometric Analysis
Many empirical studies have been conducted that yield plausible parameter values for the representative consumer's utility function. This suggests that the consumption Euler equation represents a macroeconomic equilibrium relationship that links the real interest rate with the growth rate of real per capita consumption. In this section, the parameters of the utility function are estimated with annual data on the real interest rate and consumption growth from 1831 to 2004. Before 1920, GDP growth serves as proxy for consumption growth. This sample period is much longer than those of earlier studies, which use monthly and quarterly data 7 Eichengreen (1992) highlights the detrimental effect of the gold standard during the Great Depression but, as noted by Black (1995, p. 181) , his analysis does not draw on the zero bound on the nominal interest rate. 8 DeLong (1991) and White (2008) discuss the 'liquidationist' thesis, which holds that central bankers accepted deflation because they believed that business cycle downturns were necessary to weed out unsound enterprises. Hamada and Noguchi (2005) consider the role of the authorities' monetary policy conception in macroeconomic outcomes in the United States in the 1930s and Japan in the 1990s. from the second half of the 20 th century. The advantage of the longer sample period is that it covers the Civil War and both World Wars, as well as the financial crises in the second half of the 19 th century, which all had a strong impact on the real interest rate and consumption. The estimated subjective discount rate and the coefficient of relative risk aversion lie within the range of earlier studies. Thus, the analysis of historical data confirms that the consumption Euler equation embodies an equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and consumption growth.
The following arguments set benchmarks for the parameters of the representative utility function. Equations (4) and (8) imply that the subjective discount rate equals the real interest rate when real per capita consumption is constant. Therefore, the low real interest rates that prevail in countries that are close to a steady state -for example Japan and Switzerland in the 1990s -suggest that ρ must be low, perhaps two percent per year or less. A similar argument does not apply to the coefficient of relative risk aversion because any value of θ is compatible with a steady state. But values between one and four yield a plausible marginal rate of substitution between consumption in two successive years if real per capita consumption grows at two percent per year, which is the average rate of growth from 1831 to 2004. Setting ρ = 0.02, θ = 1.5 and C t+1 /C t = 1.02, the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption is: (2004) work with θ = 1.5, and Walsh (2003, Ch. 2) adopts θ = 2 as benchmark value. Analyzing the behavior of the saving rate, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 2) conclude that θ must lie between 2 and 4, and Barro (2006) sets θ e q u a l t o 3 a n d 4 d e a l i n g w i t h the equity premium puzzle. These are high values for macroeconomists, but they are close to those used by financial economists. Shiller (2003, p. 86 ) computes a marginal rate of substitution (stochastic discount factor) with θ = 3, and the option-implied coefficients of relative risk aversion of Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004, p. 429 ) lie between about 2 and 10. Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1984) first applied the generalized method of moments (GMM) to the nonlinear consumer Euler equation (3). Using monthly data from 1959 to 1978, they estimated several models with an increasing number of lags on instruments. They found that ρ lies between 0.6 and 9.8 percent per year and θ is between 0.35 and 1. The present study provides a similar range of estimates for both parameters. Table 2 considers three time periods: 1831-2004, 1831-1929 and 1934-2004 . The years from 1930 to 1933 are excluded in all three regressions because there was a macroeconomic disequilibrium that was incompatible with the consumption Euler equation during the Great Depression. The instruments include two lags of the inflation rate and two lags of consumption growth. The estimate of ρ is 6.63 percent before the Great Depression and it is insignificantly different from zero afterwards. The decline in ρ accounts for the secular fall in the real interest rate, which can be seen in Figure  1 . The estimate of θ is less than one in both subperiods. Using the entire sample period, θ is 2.95 and ρ is insignificantly different from zero. The regression for the entire sample period was also run with 1930 to 1933 being included. Adding the depression years does not change the regression output much but the residuals indicate that these years are strong outliers. This confirms that there was a macroeconomic disequilibrium that is not captured by the consumption Euler equation during the Great Depression. 
Conditional Second Moments
The main advantage of the regression in Table 2 is that it does not require the conditional variance of consumption and the conditional covariance between consumption and the real interest rate. The catch is that the consumption Euler equation (3) is nonlinear and nonlinear GMM leads to inconsistent estimates in the presence of measurement error. The next regression uses estimates of the second moments as regressors in the log-linear consumption Euler equation (8). The standard theory of measurement error applies to this equation because it is linear in the coefficients.
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Two models are used to estimate the conditional second moments: a univariate EWMA model and a bivariate EWMA model, which was adapted from a multivariate GARCH(1,1) model that was proposed by Engle (2002) . The univariate model yields estimates of the conditional variances of consumption growth and the real interest rate, and the bivariate model adds the conditional covariance between the two variables. As seen in Figure 3 , the variances of consumption growth and the real interest rate do not return to stable long-term values. Since there is no mean-reversion, the EWMA model is preferable to the GARCH model. 12 The regression output of the volatility models is included in an Appendix that is attached to the electronic version of this paper. During the Civil War, consumption volatility rose more than fivefold from a prewar level of around 0.001 to above 0.005. Reflecting the deteriorating political and economic situation, consumption volatility started to rise three years before the outbreak of open hostilities. Between the Civil War and World War I, there were three peaks in consumption volatility -1884, 1896-98 and 1910. The economic contraction that started in 1882 culminated in a financial crisis in 1884. But the peaks in consumption volatility in 1896-98 and 1910 occurred three to four years after the financial crises of 1893 and 1907. Still, it seems likely that both spells of high consumption volatility were related to the preceding financial crises because consumption volatility started to rise in 1893 and 1907. Consumption volatility also rose during the recession after World War I and during the Great Depression in the 1930s. World War II had no major impact on consumption volatility, and by the late 1950s consumption volatility had returned to the level that had prevailed before the Civil War. In the second half of the 20 th century, consumption volatility remained low, although there was a small increase after the second oil crisis.
The volatility of the real interest rate rose markedly only in exceptional circumstances: the European revolutions in 1848, the American Civil War, World War I, the political upheaval that led to the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe in the interwar period, and World War II. European political affliction affected the American credit market either through transatlantic capital flows or through contagion. The financial crises under the classical gold standard and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system all left no mark on the volatility of the real interest rate. Thus, pure financial crises did not destabilize the real interest rate, but credit markets were disrupted by political confrontations that threatened civic society.
The covariance between consumption growth and the real interest rate measures the consumption risk of government bonds. Figure 3 -C shows that the covariance between consumption growth and the real interest rate averages zero in the long-run. Therefore, government bonds yield the riskfree interest rate in the long-run. Although low consumption risk is an inherent quality of government bonds, in exceptional circumstances it may change, either positively or negatively. During the Civil War, investors faced the possibility that a bad outcome of the War would reduce consumption and, at the same time, government bonds would become worthless, providing no hedge against the fall in consumption. The positive covariance between consumption growth and the real interest rate confirms that U.S. government bonds were being perceived as risky during the Civil War. In contrast, investors never lost confidence in the United States during both World Wars. Then, the covariance between consumption growth and the real return on government bonds turned negative, indicating that U.S. government bonds were viewed as a hedge against a fall in consumption. The same holds during the Great Depression, when deflation increased the real value of government bonds and bank failures and corporate bankruptcies affected the credit rating of private securities. Table 3 shows the estimated log-linear consumption Euler equation, using the same time periods as before. For the full sample period, two models are estimated: one including a dummy variable for the time after World War II and another including a trend instead of the dummy variable. The instruments include two lags of the inflation rate and two lags of each independent variable. The estimates confirm that the subjective discount rate ρ has declined since the 19 th century. Using all data from 1831 to 2004, the constant is 9.9 percent and the coefficient of the postwar dummy is minus 9.1 percent. Thus, ρ was 9.9 percent from 1831 until the end of World War II and it has been 9.9-9.1 = 0.8 percent since then. Replacing the postwar dummy with a trend shows that ρ fell on average by 0.08 percent per year between 1831 and 2004 (column 2). Splitting the sample period confirms this result (columns 3 and 4). 13 Considering the impact of expected consumption growth, the coefficient of relative risk aversion θ lies between 0.71 and 1.28 in the four regressions. The value of 1, which is used by Prescott (2006) and others, lies right in the middle of this range of estimates. The estimated coefficients of the second moments all carry the correct sign, but their absolute values are too large. If θ equals 1, the coefficient of the covariance between the real interest rate and consumption growth should also be 1, and the 13 Adding the Great Depression to the sample period produces positive outliers for 1932 and 1933. coefficient of the variance of consumption growth should be -1(1+1)/2 = -1. Instead, the estimated coefficients of the covariance lie between 12.0 and 44.0 and the coefficients of the variance are between -14.9 and -37.1. Thus, the second moments affected the real interest rate much more than predicted by the second order approximation of the consumption Euler equation. The likely explanation for the strong effect of the second moments on the real interest rate is that these coefficients are biased because of some omitted variable that depressed the real interest rate during wars. In particular, the loglinear Euler equation does not consider shocks to the marginal utility of consumption. During a war, the utility function becomes less steep because the horrors of war affect welfare at every level of consumption. In addition, the composition of aggregate consumption worsens because some goods become unavailable due to rationing and consumers shift away from goods whose prices skyrocket on the black market.
14 C o n s u m e r s s a v e w h e n m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y i s temporarily low during a war and they catch up by spending more when marginal utility recovers afterwards. This extra saving reduces the real interest rate during the war. Barro (2006) also proposed that an increase in the perceived probability of a disaster accounted for the fall in the real interest rate in the United States during wars in the 20 th century. 15 The possibility of a disaster reduces the real interest rate because people prepare for disasters by saving more.
Conclusion
The consumption Euler equation provides an equilibrium relationship between the real interest rate and the rate of consumption growth. The real interest rate interacts positively with the rate of consumption growth and the covariance between the interest rate and consumption growth, and it is negatively related to the variance of consumption growth. A negative real interest rate was a common occurrence in U.S. macroeconomic history. It became negative during most wars and it was negative during the oil crises. Except for the Vietnam War, whose course was more drawn out than that of other conflicts, wars and periods of national distress gave rise to consumer pessimism. In this situation, people saved because they expected that per capita consumption would fall and because the 14 McCallum and Nelson (1999) considered shocks to the utility function in a macroeconomic model. 15 Barro (1987) argued that military spending increased the interest rate in Great Britain during wars, but Barro (1993, pp. 321-322) presented conflicting evidence on the United States, which according to Romer (2006, p. 76) shows that "real interest rates appear to have been, if anything, generally lower during wars than in other periods." Both the present study and Barro (2006) leave no doubt that the real interest rate falls during wars. perceived volatility of consumption was high. Consumption was also postponed because the hardship of wars directly reduced marginal utility, shortages and rationing impaired the composition of aggregate consumption and the perceived probability of disasters increased. For these reasons, macroeconomic equilibrium required a negative real interest rate during wars and in periods of national distress. Without a negative real interest rate, there would have been excess saving and a corresponding excess supply of commodities.
Alas, the interest rate mechanism does not work automatically. The zerobound on the nominal interest rate implies that there must be inflation when the natural interest rate is negative. To this end, the United States interfered with the gold standard during the Civil War and World War I and the gold standard was not operational during World War II, while the Bretton Woods system was sufficiently flexible to accommodate short-run inflation during the Korean War. By chance, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system gave the Federal Reserve the power to inflate shortly before the first oil crisis. Inflation accommodated a negative natural interest rate during every period of national distress except the Great Depression. There is no doubt that the economic history of the 1930s would have been different if there had been deliberate inflation and a negative real interest rate after the stock market crash of 1929. Instead, deflation put the negative real interest rate out of reach until the end of the gold standard permitted inflation in 1934. For this reason, wars and periods of national distress, which are easily identifiable economic shocks, produced normal business fluctuations, whereas the Great Depression became a calamity without an obvious shock.
A growing literature, motivated by the recent occurrence of deflation and zero-interest rates in Japan, deals with the conduct of monetary policy when the nominal interest rate constraint is binding. 16 The problem is that standard openmarket purchases of government bonds by the central bank are ineffective because money and government bonds are perfect substitutes if the nominal interest rate is zero. American economic history shows how a 'liquidity trap' can be avoided when the natural interest rate is negative. The Federal Reserve (or national banks) contributed to the financing of wars by buying Treasury bonds, and the Treasury directly issued paper money, the so-called greenbacks, during the Civil War. The monetization of wartime expenditures guaranteed the normal operation of credit markets because, even with a negative natural interest rate, the nominal interest rate did not fall to zero if there was sufficient inflation. However, the inflationary financing of rising government expenditure, which required interfering with the gold standard, was considered acceptable only in exceptional circumstances, during major wars. Insisting on 'sound' budget principles, (IMF) . No adjustments were made for breaks in the series in 1857 and 1948. In 1857, the commercial paper rate was 11.00 percent (NBER) and 11.56 percent (Dick). In 1948, the 90-day Treasury bill rate and the commercial paper rate were 1.04 percent and 1.44 percent.
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